When Rudy Giuliani ran for the Republican presidential nomination in 2008, he had already changed his mind on abortion once. After switching from the pro-life movement to the pro-choice movement in his first campaign for New York City mayor, he did not believe he would be able to change his mind again in the Republican primary.

Still basking in the glory of having been “America’s mayor” on 9/11, Giuliani sought the pro-life party’s presidential nomination as a pro-choice candidate. But he made some changes to his position: He defended the partial abortion ban he fought against during his short-lived 2000 New York Senate campaign, supported parental notification laws, and vowed to appoint “strict constructionists” to the Supreme Court who could one day vote to overturn the ban. roe against. Wading.

Giuliani led the national polls for most of 2007, making him the Republican frontrunner. But his pro-choice stance ultimately proved fatal, as it motivated his disastrous political strategy of skipping the first few states. Iowa and South Carolina were too socially conservative for a New York abortion rights activist. New Hampshire might have offered more fertile ground, but he feared losing to Mitt Romney, then from neighboring Massachusetts.

Romney switched from pro-choice to pro-life and was rewarded with the Republican presidential nomination four years later. (He later had to move state from Massachusetts to Utah to continue his political career, but that’s another story.) The same thing happened four years later with Donald Trump.

Unlike Romney, Trump was elected president. And unlike Ronald Reagan, George HW Bush and George W. Bush, the judges Trump appointed did tip over roe against. WadingIf both Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas had been confirmed, it could have happened 30 years earlier – but it didn’t happen.

This whole story is set in the context of the first post-war period.roe Presidential campaign. Trump is panicking about abortion. And pro-lifers are panicking about Trump.

Trump has gone too far when he used phrases like “reproductive rights” to describe abortion (though he may have meant IVF, which is different, although it raises its own ethical pro-life questions). He has unduly watered down the pro-life foundation of the Republican platform, weakening it to a degree not seen since 1976. He still takes credit for roeHowever, he is visibly unsettled by the Republicans’ recent electoral defeats on the abortion issue, especially now that he is running in a more difficult race against a female opponent.

Just as was the case many years ago when Trump’s buddy Rudy was the Republican front-runner, Republicans, who don’t really care about the issue of abortion, are telling pro-lifers to shut up and conform if they want to win.

I have defended Trump for not rushing headlong into a position where the pro-choice position is strongest, but his backtracking on abortion has become excessive. And like his abandonment of Project 2025, it risks moving from a strategic retreat from the excesses of the conservative camp to an intensification of one of Trump’s worst tendencies: treating loyalty as a one-way street.

It would still be devastating for the pro-life movement if Vice President Kamala Harris were elected president. Her Justice Department would continue the persecution of pro-life activists and pregnancy centers, which are more important now than ever. If Harris could ever govern with a Democratic Congress, the filibuster tactic in the Senate would likely be abolished and she would sign legislation that would usher in an even worse national abortion policy than prevailed for the last 30 years of the 20th century. Roe. The health exemption would render most existing abortion restrictions ineffective and would advocate for taxpayer funding of abortion.

Regardless of whether Trump was the most sincere pro-lifer, he was the most successful in his first term. The power of pro-lifers to achieve their preferred policy goals at all levels of government currently hinges on this election. The fact that they are failing to do so in many states has more to do with the weakness of their current position than with Trump’s lack of pro-life zeal.

The question is how to improve that position. Defeating Giuliani to ensure that Republicans remain a pro-life party advanced the cause. But that came during the Republican primary, when abortion rates were declining, after years of sporadic successes for the pro-life movement in both the legislature and in public opinion, and before a general election that was unlikely to be won by any Republican after Iraq and the Great Recession. This, on the other hand, is an election that can be won against a candidate who supports government-funded abortion on demand and measures that codify the most permissive interpretation of the law. roe and occupy the Supreme Court to continue his current anti-roe majority.

Even if Trump were to lose the election because he did not motivate pro-life voters to vote for him, there is a strong possibility that Republicans would come to the opposite conclusion – that he was defeated because he roe– and they’re going to avoid abortion more and more. They’re going to hear that from donors and the media. And that’s exactly what Republicans have done after their election losses in the past, even though there was pretty clear evidence in the Election Day polls that proved otherwise.

Trump is a unique figure who is not influenced in the same way as a normal politician, and he is limited to a single term. He has chosen a running mate who is even more pro-life than he is, even if JD Vance is currently having to toe the line of his boss (as Dick Cheney once did on the issue of gay marriage).

It is possible that pro-lifers will get lucky and Harris will not get the support she needs in Congress to push through the most radical abortion measures. Even the worst-case scenario in November suggests that Republicans could hold 51 seats in the Senate next year. An election forecast by the hill and Decision Desk gives Republicans in the House a better chance of keeping their majority than Trump of winning the White House.

Then Harris might be unpopular again and the Democrats might have a bad midterm election. The Senate distribution for 2026 looks favorable for the Republicans. But was the politics of the last decade really so predictable?

These are the dilemmas facing a pro-life movement that no longer has significant bipartisan support. The future is difficult to predict. The past performance and current positioning of the two major party candidates should not make the decision a close one for prudent pro-life activists, especially those in swing states.

Trump won the biggest victory for pro-lifers in 50 years. Harris wants to take it away from them.