In Regarding Kellya former executor and trustee of a testamentary trust commenced probate proceedings in district court. No. 11-24-00066-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 3735 (Tex. App.—Eastland, May 30, 2024, original proceeding). An opposing party asserted claims against him in the probate proceedings and also filed a suit in district court to remove him as trustee. The former executor filed a motion for relief in district court, claiming that the district court had primary jurisdiction over the dispute. After the district court denied the motion for relief, the former executor filed a petition for an administrative order.

The appeals court noted that, as a general rule, the court in which the action is first filed acquires primary jurisdiction, excluding other coordinating courts. “Thus, where two actions are inherently related, a motion to dismiss in the second action must be granted.” ID. The court explained that it must determine whether the district court’s probate jurisdiction extends to the issues raised by the district court. The court noted that “the probate jurisdiction in Texas is quite complex, to say the least.” Probate cases must be filed and heard in a court that exercises original probate jurisdiction, which in this specific case was the district court. If it exercises its original probate jurisdiction, the district court has jurisdiction over “all matters relating to the probate case(s)” under section 31.002 of the Probate Code. The court explained:

Section 31.002(b), in turn, states that the jurisdiction of a probate court extends to “the interpretation and administration of a testamentary trust when the will creating the trust has been admitted to probate in court.” The parties dispute the meaning of “administration” in Section 31.002(b). …

In this case, we are called upon to determine the meaning of the term “administration” or the act of administration, which is defined as “to direct the affairs of something” or “to direct or supervise the execution, use, or conduct of something.” As such, the “administration” of a trust by a probate court under section 31.002(b) would include any act that directs or supervises the execution, use, or conduct of the testamentary trust. The removal of trustees is one of the ways in which Texas courts are called upon to “direct” and “conduct” a trust. We also note that Chapter 113 of the Property Code, which contains the requirements for the removal of trustees, is titled “Administration.” Although this title does not reflect the otherwise clear meaning of the provisions that follow, it indicates the legislature’s desire that the “administration” of a trust include the appointment and removal of trustees. Because of the common and ordinary meaning of the word “administration,” as well as the use of the same term in the Property Act, we conclude that the meaning of “administration” in section 31.002(b)(2) of the Probate Code clearly extends to the removal of trustees. However, even if we were to conclude that section 31.002(b)(2) does not extend the district court’s jurisdiction to the removal of trustees appointed under a testamentary trust, the district court’s jurisdiction is not strictly limited to section 31.002. Rather, the district court, when sitting as a probate court, may also exercise “pendent and supplementary jurisdiction to the extent necessary to promote the efficiency and economy of justice.” … “Ordinarily, probate courts exercise concurrent or supplementary jurisdiction when there is a close relationship between the non-estate claims and the matter pending in the probate court.” That is, probate courts will exercise concurrent or supplementary jurisdiction when doing so “contributes to the efficient administration of a matter pending in the probate court.” We conclude that even if the removal of a trustee were not a probate matter within the district court’s jurisdiction under section 31.002, the district court would still have jurisdiction to remove Randy as trustee by virtue of its concurrent and supplementary jurisdiction under section 32.001. Moreover, Todd’s remaining claims, involving alleged misuse of trust funds, clearly fall within the “administration” of the trust assets within the meaning of section 31.002(b)(2). Accordingly, the district court could properly exercise jurisdiction over any claims asserted by Todd in the district court.

IDThe court held that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to reduce relief because the district court has jurisdiction to appoint and remove trustees under the testamentary trust and because it was the court first seized and had primary jurisdiction.